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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HARLEY R. BRUNDAGE,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No.

16972

IML FREIGHT, INC., SPECIAL
FUND OF UTAH, and THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,:
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

NATURE OF CASE
This is a Workmen's Compensation Act case dealing with
a claim filed by plaintiff on appeal, Harley Brundage, against
his defendant employer, IML Freight, Inc., and the defendant
Second Injury or Special Fund of §§35-1-68 and 35-1-69
U.C.A. for injuries he suffered on June 18, 1977 (R. 113)
arising out of or in the course of his employment.

Plaintiff

alleges that the combination of a pre-existing ·physical impairment coupled with the physical impairment from the industrial injury makes him unemployable and therefore permanently
and totally disabled pursuant to §35-1-67 U.C.A.
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DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
On ~anuary 24, 1980, an Administrative Law Judge entered
an Order which granted certain benefits to plaintiff but
denied the claim for permanent total disability benefits
(R. 528-535)
that Order.

Plaintiff timely filed a Motion for Review of
(R. 537-545)

The Motion for Review was denied on

a review by the Industrial Commissioners in a most unusual
manner.

One Commissioner concluded that the evidence supported

plaintiff's claim of permanent and total disability.

One

Commissioner was of the opinion the decision of the Administrativ
Law Judge should be affirmed.

The third Commissioner disqualifi

himself from participation for personal reasons.

(R.

548-

549)
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Petition for Writ of Review
(R. 550-551) and a Writ of Review issued (R. 552-553) bringing
this matter before the Supreme Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff requests a reversal of the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits plaintiff should be entitled to
receive as a permanently and totally disabled workman pursuant
to §35-1-67 U.C.A. as the unrebutted and irrefutable evidence
makes the denial arbitrary and capricious.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Harley Brundage, was born January 30,
1924.

(R. 104)

He has spent 30 years of his adult life

employed as a truck driver, the last 17 years of which he was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-2- by the Utah State Library.
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employed with defendant IML Freight.

( R • 10 5)

He has

achieved a formal education of 8 years plus one year of night
classes in auto mechanics courses that he did not complete.
( R. 106)

His work life has been spent entirely as a manual

laborer or as a truck driver.

(R.

106)

In August of 1975 in a nonwork related event plaintiff
injured his back while starting the motor on his fishing boat.
(R. 106)

He ultimately was referred to Dr. Charles Rich,

a neurosurgeon, who, in October of 1975, operated on plaintiff
to remove intervertebral disc material at the L3-4 level in
his back.

(R. 109-110)

Though he was never completely free from pain following
the operation, plaintiff improved enough to be released to
return to work and pass the Interstate Commerce Commission
physical examination in October of 1976.

(R. 110-111)

Thereafter, he was able to work regularly until June 18, 1977.
(R.

111, 113).
on June 18, 1977 while in the course of his employment

with IML Freight, Mr Brundage again injured his back.

This

time he was in Madison, Iowa unloading 50 pound bags of potatoes
from his truck.

In the process of taking one particular bag

from the top of a 6 foot high stack he twisted while bending
to put the bag down.

He immediately experienced severe pain

in the lower back and into both legs.

The pain was grave

enough that he was forced to lay on the floor of the trailer
for fifteen minutes before his co-driver could assist
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him out of the trailer.
back to Salt Lake.

The next day the company flew him

(R. 113-116)

Upon plaintiff's return to Salt Lake, the company doctor
referred him to orthopedic surgeon, Dr. A.F. Martin.

After

a short period of unsuccessful conservative management of
his condition, Dr. Martin admitted Mr. Brundage to the Valley
West Hospital.
1977.

A second surgery was performed on August 1,

117-118)

(R.

Following the surgery, the plaintiff's condition began to
improve until December of 1977.

At that time while walking

in a normal manner, he caught his heel in a rug which caused his
weight to shift forward.

While he didn't fall down or have

any dramatic accident, he did experience an increase in his
symptoms which have continued to the present.

These symptoms, in

the plaintiff's opinion, make it so that he cannot return to
truck driving.

(R. 118-121)

Mr. Brundage is personally not

aware of any occupation available to a man in his physical
(R. 122)

condition.
to work.

No doctor has released him to return

(R. 119)

The plaintiff has suffered a 30% physical impairment from
all causes.

15% of that impairment is the result of the

non-industrial accident and 15% is the result of the industrial
accident.

(R. 531)

The various physicians who have been involved in either
the treatment or analysis of Mr. Brundage's physical impairment imply or directly state that the physical impairment
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translates into total disablement or unemployability.

Dr.

A.F. Martin, the treating physician for the second injury
has stated the following at various times:
August 14, 1978 - ''It is my feeling that this
man should not return to doing long haul driving.
(R. 65)
August 30, 1978 - Patient will be unable to
do previous type of work - that of long haul
driving.
In order to become part of the work
force again, he will have to learn some other
trade, but that will be difficult.
His sitting
and standing capabilities are limited. (R. 202)
December 6, 1978 - His course at the present
time is very poor. He continues to take pain
medication and muscle relaxants and demonstrates
very poor lumbar spine motion with tenderness
in the midportion of his back, loss of f lextion
capability to approximately 30% of what one would
expect. He is consequently unemployable at the
present time, but by the same token, I don't think
he was employable on August 14, 1978 either.
(emphasis added)
Because of concern for Mr. Brundage's condition,
Dr. Charles Rich, who performed the first operation, was
asked to reexamine Mr. Brundage following the second surgery.
In total agreement with Dr. Martin, Dr. Rich stated the
following in August of 1978:
Sitting or walking are particularly bad for him, I tend
to believe his symptoms are valid, and would agree it
is best for him not to try to continue in his job as a
line driver for IML. Were it possible for him to do
work, for instance, in the shop which would not require
bending or lifting he might well tolerate this but from
a practicle standpoint it is difficult to see how h-e--can comfortably perform the work which he is trained to
do.
It would seem, therefore, to be in his medical
best interest to be medically retired. • •
(R. 163)
(emphasis added)
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In June of 1978 Dr. Robert Satovick was called in for
consultation

and examination.

In a letter addressed to Dr.

Martin dated June 13, 1978 Dr. Satovick commented that:
. . . I would agree that because of the persistence
of the complaint and the two previous surgeries and
the nature of his job with IML that he should go
ahead and institute the necessary proceedings for
medical retirment.
(R. 213)
Dr. A. James Mccalister, the doctor for IML Freight
addressing the Driver's Personnel Department of !ML Freight
on September 5, 1978 made the following comment:
It seems to be the concensus of opinion, with which I
would agree, that he probably will not be able to return
to his former occupation and should seek some other
line of work.
(R. 217)
With that background the matter was set for evidentiary
hearing on January 25, 1979.

At that time Dr. William H. Brown,

a clinical psychologist with vast experience in analyzing
injured workmen for vocational rehabilitation purposes, testifiea
(R. 80)

It was Dr. Brown's opinion that without further

training Mr. Brundage would not be able to handle any occupation
and none were available at the present time to the best of
the doctor's knowledge.

(R. 91, 95, 103)

Dr. Brown further

was of the opinion that with Mr. Brundage's I.Q. level he
would not be successful in college level educational pursuits.
(R. 93-94)

Dr. Brown further stated that Mr. Brundage would

more than likely fail in attempts at sales type duties
because of the emotional state caused by his injuries.
94-95)

(R.

It was or. Brown's recommendation that Mr. Brundage

be referred to the experts at the Division of Vocational
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

Rehabilitation for evaluation and possible retraining for an
alternative vocation.

(R.

92, 102)

At the time of the hearing it was Mr. Brundage's desire
to be retrained to an alternative vocation if his physicians
and the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation found him
capable.

(R.

122)

Following the initial hearing, on January 29, 1979,
the Administrative Law Judge referred plaintiff to Richard
Olsen, a counselor with the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation assigned to the Industrial Commission.

The purpose

of the referral was for "Mr. Olsen [to] review possibilities
of new job opportunities."

(R. 232)

Mr. Olsen's profes-

ssional opinions concerning this case will be discussed in
detail further on in this statement of facts.
After the initial hearing in this matter, counsel for
defendant IML Freight felt it advisable to have an independent
evaluation of the situation by orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Boyd
Holbrook.

Thereafter, on March 16, 1979, plaintiff was examined

by Dr. Holbrook.

Dr. Holbrook's opinion was entirely con-

sistent with the prior treating physicians that Mr. Brundage
was totally disabled.

He stated in pertinent part:

• • • he demonstrated almost complete immobility
of the low back. • •
I believe at the present time that the
applicant is totally disabled as far as
returning to his former occupation is
concerned. He might be able to find some
sheltered special type of occupation consistent with his present activities. • • .
(R. 405-406)
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During the pendency of the workmen's compensation claim
Mr. Brundage applied for Social Security benefits.

Following

a full hearing on the Social Security Administration's
original denial of his claim, he was found to be "not able
to do [his] previous work • . • [and he is] unable to engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful activity • •
(R. 444)

"

At that hearing G. Barrie Nielson, a vocational

expert called on by the Social Security Administration to
evaluate Mr. Brundange, testified that he knew of no work
that Mr. Brundage could perform while under his present
physical limitations.

(R.

446, 448)

Dr. Gordon R. Kimball, an orthopedic surgeon, was
also called upon by the Social Security Administration to
analyze plaintiff's condition.
on August 22, 1979.

He examined Mr. Brundage

Dr. Kimball found the following limi-

tations on the physical activity that could be performed by
Mr. Brundage:
1.

During an 8 hour day he could sit no longer
than 1 hour, stand no longer than 2 hours,
walk no longer than 1 hour.

2.

He could lift no more than 15 pounds.

3.

He cannot use his feet and legs in
repetitive movements as in pushing and
pulling of leg controls.

4.

He cannot bend, squat, crawl or climb.

s.

He cannot work at unprotected heights or
be around moving machinery.

6.

He has mild restriction to marked change
in temperatures and humidity.
(R.

461)
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Dr. Kimball's recommendation was that:

"This patient

is moderately disabled for all practical purposes regarding
any type of medium or heavy work.

I believe that he could

engage in only sedentary activities including, no lifting
over 15 pounds, no prolonged sitting, no prolonged standing,
or walking and no bending or twisting."

(R. 460)

Further hearing was held in this case on January 14,
1980 at which time the medical panel chairman Dr. Nathanial
Nord, Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson and Richard Olsen of the Division
of Vocational Rehabilitation testified.

Dr. Nord testified

that the medical panel made no attempt and was not charged with
making a determination of the applicant's disability or
employability and only made a determination of the loss
of bodily function.

(R. 473)

At no time at the hearing

did Dr. Nord comment on the issue of disability or
employability.
Dr. Hebertson was entirely in agreement in his testimony
with the physical limitations that Dr. Kimball placed upon
Mr. Brundage.

(R. 484)

He was further of the opinion that

there was no physical or manual labor job that Mr. Brundage
could perform.

He testified that the physical.restrictions

are permanent in nature.

(R.

485)

On cross-examination, Dr. Hebertson testified that:
• • • its even difficult to perceive that
he might be able to engage in sedentary
vocations. Because very often • • • the
degree of sitting and standing for any
prolonged period of time becomes a very
limited and restrictive factor.
(R. 487)
(emphasis added)
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Next Richard Olsen, who was assigned to the Industrial
Commission from the Division of Rehabilitation services
agreed with the findings of the prior vocational
rehabilitation expert regarding the employability and retrainability of Mr. Brundage.

(R. 494}

It is Mr. Olsen's duty

in his capacity with the Industrial Commission to attempt to
get industrially injured individuals back into the labor
force.

(R. 495)

Mr. Olsen was familiar with the job

market in Utah and with the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles.

(R. 496)

It was his opinion that no job was

available to Mr. Brundage under the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles and that there was no occupation available with the
limitations that Mr. Brundage has.

(R. 498-500)

More particularly Mr. Olsen testified that:
It has been my experience that, when you
place a person in the labor market, that
there are certain minimum requirements in
the most sedentary of jobs, and that his
limitations preclude him functioning rnthe labor market as we know it with those
kinds of restrictions.
with the set of circumstances that I
have seen, I would say that the outcome
[of rehabilitation efforts] would be very,
very guarded in terms of retraining him to
gainful employment. • . • Even though he
might be able to do a job as far as his
mental capabilities, given the requirements
on the job of sitting for periods of time
which exceeds what he has been recommended
that he can do, would create problems for
him in holding the job.
So unless the job
was flexable enough that they could fit
into his set of circumstances he wouldn't
be an acceptable candidate in the labor
market.
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Q

Are you talking about a guarded workshop
condition?

A

Yes.

Q

Protected workshop?

A

Basically that's what I would say.

Q

Do you know of any such that's available to
Mr. Brundage currently? In the telephone
solicitation for example?

A

I know of none.

Q

Do you know of any jobs available to Mr. Brundage
in the Utah area?

A

No, I know of none in the Utah area.

Q

I want to make sure I heard you right. Did you
say there are no sheltered workshop type jobs
available for Mr. Brundage that you are aware of?

A

None that I am aware of.

(R. 498-502) (emphasis added)
On cross-examination by counsel for the Special Fund,
Mr. Olsen was asked whether the sheltered workshop type job
would have a tendancy to change constantly as to availability.
Mr. Olsen answered that question indicating that there was very
little turnover because the people in the sheltered workshop
would not qualify for placement in the labor market and therefore
there are very few opportunities for new individuals to
enter into a sheltered workshop.

(R. 504)

No evidence whatsoever was introduced to rebut the evidence
of unemployability by the numerous physicians and by the two
vocational rehabilitation experts by any defendant to this action.
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t ..

Nonetheless, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order
that was affirmed in a tie vote of one to one of the Industrial Commission denying Harley Brundage benefits under
§35-1-67 U.C.A.

The sole basis in evidence for such a

denial was that the Commission would take:
administrative notice of the literally
dozens of brands of home products being sold out
of the home wherein the seller can solicit by
telepone, by mail or door-to-door and can work as
long as he pleases either standing up or sitting
down or moving about as may fit his particular
case. There are home solicitation jobs and
mailing jobs where the solicitor can work as long
or as little as he pleases assuming any bodily
position he pleases and shifting that position as
frequently as need be.
I assume we could take
administrative notice in this electronic age of many
jobs where an employee can stand and sit on a
stool and do the hand and finger work within the
capabilities of a normally intelligent individual
such as Mr. Brundage was found to be by the
rehabilitation counselor. The applicant's request
for a finding that he is permanently and totally
disabled is denied."
(R. 532)
It is the position of plaintiffs that not only the
weight of the evidence but the only evidence in this case
is that as a result of the combination of injuries, advanced
age, and rehabilitation potentials that Harley Brundage is
permanently and totally disabled.

The Industrial Commission

acts without or in excess of its authority when it takes
administrative notice of evidence not introduced by any party
and that is directly refuted by physicians and its own vocational rehabilitation expert and other vocational rehabilitation
experts as to a claim of permanent total disability.
Further, plaintiff takes the position that where there
is not a majority of the Commission concurring in a denial of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-12- by the Utah State Library.
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benefits, then the injured employee, under the framework of the
Workmen's Compensation Act has fulfilled his burden and should
be awarded benefits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT FINDING
PLAINTIFF PERMANENTLY AND TOTALLY DISABLED.
In the undisputed fact situation hereinbefore presented,
plaintiff finds himself in what has been termed by Professor
Arthur Larson and most authorities the "odd-lot" category.
Professor Larson discusses the "odd-lot" doctrine in some
detail in his learned treatise on workmen's compensation:
"Total disability" . . . is not to be interpreted literally as utter and abject helplessness. Evidence that claimant has been able
to earn occasional wages-or perform certain
kinds of gainful work does not necessarily
rule out a finding of total disability nor
require that it be reduced to partial . • • •
. • • Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted
in virtually every jurisdiction total disability may be found in the case of workers
who, while not altogether incapacitated for
work, are so handicapped that they will
not be employed regularly in any well known
branch of the labor market. The essence of
the test is the probable dependability with
which claimant can sell his services in a
competitive labor market, undistorteq by such
factors as business booms, sympathy of a
particular employer or friends, temporary good
luck, or the superhuman efforts of the claimant
to rise above his crippling handicaps. (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
Larson, workmen's Compensation Law, §57.51 pp. 10-107,
10-109, 10-119.
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As cited by Larson, the early English case of Cardiff
Corporation v. Hall, lKB 1009 (1911) was perhaps the first to
discuss the import of the "odd-lot" doctrine:
There are cases in which the burden of shewing
suitable work can in fact be obtained does
fall upon the employer • . • [I]f • • • the
capacities for work left to him fit him only
for special uses and do not • • • make his
powers of labour a merchantable article in some
well known lines of the labour market . . . it
is incumbent upon the employer to shew that
such special employment can in fact be obtained
by him • . • . [I]f the accident leaves the
workman's labour in the position of an "oddlot" in the labour market, the employer must
shew that a customer can be found who will
take it . . . • (emphasis added)
Judge Cordoza very early in the history of workmen's
compensation acts in the United States set the policy for
odd-lot determinations:
He was an unskilled or common laborer.
He coupled his request for employment with
notice that labor must be light. The applicant imposing such conditions is quickly
put aside for more versatiel competitors.
Business has little patience with the suitor
for ease and favor.
He is the 'odd-lot'
man, the nondescript in the labor market.
Work if he gets it, is likely to be casual
and intermittent . • • • Rebuff, if suffered, might reasonably be ascribed to the
narrow opportunities that await the sick
and the halt.
(emphasis added)
Jordan v. Decorative Co., 130 N.E. 634 at 635-~36 (N.Y. 1921)
The unrebutted evidence in the case at bar shows plaintiff to be in that category of "narrow opportunities that
await the sick and the halt."

He is indeed an "odd-lot"

employee.

-14-
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As Judge Moulton ascribed in Cardiff Corp.

v.

Hall, supra,

the burden should be on the appropriate defendant to aff irmatively show employability once prima facie unemployability
is shown by the applicant.

A number of examples of that

burden in practice can be shown from decisions in neighboring
jurisdictions to Utah.

In Brown v. Safeway Stores, 483 P.2d

305 (N.M. 1971) the plaintiff was an 18 year old boy, had
a high school education, was trained to plant cucumbers
and potatoes, and suffered from an injured back.

The Court

concluded that he might be employed at something, but that
there was no evidence of that in the record to support such
a finding.

Therefore, the Court found the injured employee

to be totally disabled.

The defendant contended that the

burden was on the plaintiff to show that he was disabled
from doing any work for which he was fitted by age, education,
training and previous experience.

To that the Court responded:

We agree that the proof of the disability is
on the plaintiff, but after plaintiff has introduced evidence as to his age, education,
training, and mental capacity, the burden of
coming forward is on the defendant.
It is much
easier for the defendant to prove the employability of the plaintiff for a particular job
than for plaintiff to try to prove the
universal negative of not being employable at any work.
If the defendant chooses
to stand on the evidence introduced by
plaintiff and not rebut the evidence,
he may run a great risk since the issue
may become one of substantial evidence,
which is not a question of quantity but
substance. (emphasis added)

483 P.2d at 308.
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Oregon has similary ruled in the case of Swinson v.
Westport Lumber, 470 P.2d 1005 (Or. 1971). Therein, the
applicant was a 63 year old man who had a 60% disability of
the right leg and sustained a serious low back injury.

He

was restricted from heavy lifting, stooping, squating,
bending and could not walk more than four or five blocks
without experiencing additional pain.

He could not sit,

stand, or lie in one position for a prolonged period of
time.

In Oregon, the Supreme Court is given the power to

denovo the entire record.

revi~

Upon review of the entire record

and in response to the defendant's claim that he could be
employed in light work the Supreme Court made an award of
permanent total disability.

The Court commented as follows

in supporting its opinion:
Total disability under the Workmen's Compensation Act does not mean permanent
utter happlessness. (Case cited) The
fact that a claimant is capable of performing
some light work or earning occasional wages
does not necessarily preclude a finding of
total disability. • . • This rule is essentially . . . the so called 'odd-lot' doctrine.
It is a well recognized principle of workmen's compensation law that a claimant workman must prove that he has sustained
a compensable injury.
(Cases cited) Where,
however, does the burden of proof lie in
circumstances such as those before us
now? Claimant contends that since he is
clearly in the 'odd-lot' category, defendant's
have the burden of showing the availability
of regular, suitable employment.
Defendants
argue that the claimant must prove his is an
'odd-lot' employee and that he has not done
so.

-16-
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The Court went on to approvingly cite Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law:
• . . opinions have stressed that the burden
is on the employer to prove the availability
of steady work, once the claimant has been
shown to be in the 'odd-lot' category. There
is no presumption that, merely because claimant
is physically able to do light work, appropriate
employment is regularly available to him.
If the evidence of degree of obvious
physical impairment, coupled with other factors,
such as claimant's mental capacity, education,
training, or age places claimant prima facie
in the 'odd-lot' category, the burden should
be on the employer to show that some kind of
suitable work is regularly and continously
available to the claimant . . • • (emphasis added)
The Oregon Supreme Court followed the above decision with
a similar opinion favoring a claimant who was 54 years of age
when he suffered a back injury resulting in a permanent partial
loss of bodily function of 25%.

See Barley v. Morrison-Knudsen,

479 P.2d 1005 (Ore. 1971).
In Employers Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
541 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1975), the Arizona Supreme Court found that
an employee with similar restrictions to those of plaintiff in
the case at bar was permanently and totally disabled.

The

Court placed the burden on the defendant of showing available
and suitable employment:
Absent proof of employment reasonably
available to one in the 'odd-lot' category
the injured employee may be classified as
totally disabled. •
we turn next to the question as to whether
the employer and carrier met the burden of
showing available and suitable employment

-17-
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in presenting evidence about possible employment as a hoist operator. The evidence reflected that such employment was available in
the Tucson area less than 30 days a year.
It
was not shown that no bending would be required
or that hoist operators were always free to
change positions at will.
Such evidence falls
far short of that required to establish available and suitable employment.
The failing in the instant case is far greater than even
that in the Employer Mutual Life Insurance case from Arizona.
Here no evidence whatsoever was presented to refute the unemployability of Mr. Brundage as a result of the combination of
injuries from which he suffers.
In similar circumstances the Idaho Supreme Court has stated
that where the evidence is undisputed and is reasonably
susceptible to only one interpretation, whether a claimant
falls within the odd-lot category is a conclusion of law.
In the same case the Court held that where the individual
does fall within the odd-lot category the burden is on
the defendant to show some kind of suitable work is regularly
and continuously available to an injured workman.

The Court

did so by reversing an Industrial Commission decision denying
benefits to an injured employee.

Lyons v. Industrial Special

Indemnity Fund, 565 P.2d 1360 (Idaho 1977).
At page 10-137 in Larson, supra, on the issue of the
burden under the odd-lot doctrine Professor Larson states at footnote
26, "Of course, if claimant • • • can put in evidence
affirmatively showing that light work is not available, his
case is that much stronger."
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With that framework of the law and policy considerations from
other jurisdictions, it is now appropriate to discuss the law
in Utah.
For the convenience of the Court §35-1-67 U.C.A. upon
which a permanent total award is predicated is set out in
pertinent part below:
. . . a finding by the commission of permanent
total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such time as the
following proceedings have been had: Where the
employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, 1)
it shall be
mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah ref er such employee to the division of
vocational rehabilitation under the state
board of education for rehabilitation training
and it shall be the duty of the commission to
order paid to such vocational rehabilitation
division, out of that special fund provided
for by section 35-1-68(1), not to exceed
$1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and
training of such employee; the rehabilitation
and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section
35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation
of employees having combined injuries.
If and
when the division of vocational rehabilitation
under the state board of education certifies
to the industrial commission of Utah • • •
that such employee has fully co-operated with
the division of vocational rehabilitation in
its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the
opinion of the division the employee may not
be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order
that there be paid to such employee weekly
benefits . • • • 1)
for such period of time
beginning with the time that the payments (as
in this section provided) to be made by the
employer or its insurance carrier terminate
and ending with the death of the employee.

* * * * *

The division of vocational rehabilitation
shall at the termination of the vocational
training of the employee, certify to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-19digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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industrial commission of Utah the work the
employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon
the commission shall, after notice of the employer and an opportunity to be heard, dete~
mine whether the employee has, notwithstanding
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily
function.
(emphasis added)
The first Utah case discussing the relative burdens in
proving permanent and total disability is Caillet v. Industrial
Cornrn'n, 58 P.2d 760.

(Utah 1936).

There the Industrial

Commission had denied that the applicant was permanently and
totally disabled.

The Court found:

The evidence in this case • • • conclusively
show[s] that the plaintiff is permanently
and totally disabled from either securing
or performing work of the general character
that he was performing when injured.
He
by such evidence established a prima facie
case, and in the absence of any showing that
he is able to secure and perform work of a
special nature not generally available,
he is as a matter of law, entitled to an
award as and for permanent total disability.
(cases cited)
No evidence was offered or
received before the Commission which showed,
or tended to show, that plaintiff is able
to secure employment of a special nature not
generally available or that he is able to
perform the duties of such employment.
The
evidence is all to the contrary.
Upon this record plaintiff as a matter of law is
entitled to compensation as and for permanent
total disability. • . . (emphasis added)
That is clearly the status of the case before the court
at this point in time.

Caillet, supra shows that the law

in the State of Utah as early as 1936 placed the burden on
the defendants to show availability of special work once the
applicant has shown its unavailability.

Additionally, "to

make out a case of total disability, the applicant is not
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required to show that he incapacitated from performing any
and all kinds of work."

Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial

Comm'n, 277 P. 206 (Utah 1929).
In the Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 424 P.2d 138 (Utah 1967) the Utah Supreme court
again delineated the test of a permanent total disability:
• • • [T]hat a workman may be found totally
disabled if by reason of the disability resulting from his injury he cannot perform
work of the general character he was performing when injured, or any other work which a
man of his capabilities may able to do or
to learn to do • . . .
In light of the overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence
and under the tests of the Utah Supreme Court, the only
conclusion that is supported by the evidence is that Harley
Brundage is permanently and totally disabled.

The case of

Beverly R. Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 587 P.2d
1 (Utah 1978) is precisely in point.

Therein the Court succinctly

stated the status of a claimant's rights when a combination·
of injuries takes the individual from the work force.

The

Court was presented with the factual situation where the applicant, due to a combination of pre-existing as well as
industrial injuries, was made unemployable.

The testimony of

her treating physician to that point was unrebutted.

The

only additional

evidence presented in that case was that of the applicant herself indicating that she was totally disabled.

No defendant,

as in the case before the Commission now, made any effort to
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refute the evidence of her treating physician or herself that
she was totally disabled.

The Court analyzed the situation

as follows:
. . . the Commission is not vested with
arbitrary powers; and it cannot simply
ignore competent and credible evidence when
there is nothing discrediting therein and
there is no evidence to the contrary •
• • • it is the Commission's duty to determine
whether that loss of function represents
total disability in terms of capacity
to perform remunerative employment, and the
determination must be based on competent
evidence.
• • • if after a substantial permanent partial
disability award is made, it is discovered
empirically that that injured employee is not
employable with his disability and it is
certified that he cannot be vocationally
rehabilitated despite his cooperation there
is prima facie justification (subject, of course,
to refutation) for changing the disability~ _ _ _
rating from partial to total.
In the case at bar, it has been certified by Richard Olsen,
the Commission's vocational rehabilitation expert that despite
the cooperation of Mr. Brundage, he cannot be vocationally
rehabilitated.

There is no refutation of that evidence.

Further, as in the Buxton case:
Plaintiff's testimony about (her) condition
of pain and disability, although admittedly
subjective, is corroberated by the medical
evidence, and without any indication or
suggestion that (her) affliction and inability
is other than genuine.
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The decision of the Industrial Commission places plaintiff
in a very real and tragic dilemma.

On the one hand, plaintiff

expressed a sincere desire to be employed.
be rehabilitated through training.

He was willing to

(R. 122)

He qualified for

such training as was statutorily available pursuant ot §§35-1-67
and 35-1-69 U.C.A.

He was referred to the Division of Voca-

tional Rehabilitation by the Industrial Commission.

(R. 232)

The vocational rehabilitation expert attached to the Commission
testified that the plaintiff, though willing, was not a
candidate for rehabilitation.

His physical limitations

would make it impossible for him to complete the rehabilitation
courses.

Even if he could complete rehabilitation, no jobs

would be available to him.

(See Statement of Facts)

Other

vocational rehabilitation experts concurred in that proposition.

(R. 446, 448)

On the other hand, the Commission, contrary to the
uncontroverted certification of its own independent expert,
denied that plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled.
That is completely contrary to the mandate of §35-1-67 U.C.A.
that when the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation is of
the opinion, " . • • the employee may not be rehabilitated,
then the Commission shall

. order that compensation be

paid for the remainder of the employee's life."

Not only is

the Commission's decision unfair to a man who makes a good
faith effort to be rehabilitated, it is cruel

"

rebuff,

if suffered, might reasonably be ascribed to the narrow
oooortunities
thatLawawait
the
sick provided
and bythe
halt."
Jordan,
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POINT II
THE COMMISSION CANNOT TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE
NOTICE OF FACTS CONTRARY TO COMPETENT,
CREDIBLE, UNCONTROVERTED, IMPARTIAL
EVIDENCE.
The major premise upon which the Commission based its
denial of the benefits claimed by the plaintiff, is that jobs
were available in home solicitation and benchwork employment.
(R. 532)

Though the defendant employer and the defendant

Special Fund, did not have or present any evidence; evidence
of Dr. Hebertson, Dr. Brown, Richard Olson, the Social Security
Administration, G. Barrie Nielson, and the plaintiff himself
showed that no such jobs were available to the plaintiff.

The

Conunission wrongfully took administrative notice of facts
not in evidence that were directly controverted by competent,
substantive evidence most of which could not be claimed to
be tainted by bias and prejudice.

The Commission stepped

out of its impartial fact finder role to become an advocate
against the plaintiff by

rel~eving

defendants of their

burden.
Rule 9 of the ntah Rules of Evidence states in pertinent
part:
Judicial notice shall be taken without request
by a party . . . of propositions of generalized
knowledge as are so universally known that
they cannot reasonably be the subject o'fdispute.
Judicial notice may be taken without request by
a party of . . . such facts as are so generally
known or of such common notoriety within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court that they
cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. • . •
(emphasis added)
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Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that this
Court can review the rulings of the judge under Rule 9,
supra.

Plaintiff puts it to this Court that it is incredible

that the Commission could even remotely find that the uncontroverted evidence of unemployability in this case is so
fanciful that it " . . . cannot reasonably be the subject of
dispute."

It appears probable that this extreme misapplication

of administrative notice has·crept into these proceedings because
the Order was written without reference to the transcript of
the second hearing.

(R. 465)

In fact, the tanscript was

not even requested by the Commissioners who were to review
the record on plaintiff's Motion for Review until March 21,
1980 - ten days after the plaintiff's Motion for Review had
been denied.

(R. 465, 548)

When one couples all of the above with the hornbook
workman's compensation law that reasonable doubt as to statutory
and rule construction should be resolved in favor of the injured
employee, a grave misjustice has taken place in this case.
See, i.e. McPhie v. Industrial Cornrn'n, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah
1977); M&K Corp. v. Industrial Cornrn'n, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah
1948); and Park Utah Consol. Mine Co. v. Industrial Cornrn'n,
36 P.2d 979 (1934).
This Court based on the authoirty of Rule 12 U.R.E. should
find the administrative notice of the Commission improper and

-25-
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remand the case for an order that plaintiff is permanently
and totally disabled as the only competent evidence in the
record would indicate.
POINT III
IF A MAJORITY OF THE COMMISSION DOES
NOT VOTE TO SUSTAIN AN ORDER DENYING
BENEFITS, THEN THE BENEFITS SHOULD
BE ORDERED.
This case presents a most unique situation.

As the Court

will recognize, the Industrial Commission is made up of the
three Commissioners.
business
pating.

In order for the Commission to conduct

a quorum or majority must be present and partici§35-1-6 U.C.A.

In the instant case Commissioner

Milton E. Saathoff disqualified himself.

Commissioner Carlyle

F. Gronning was of the opinion that the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge should be sustained.

Commissioner

Stephen M. Hadley, the Chairman and only attorney of the three,
expressed the opinion that an award of permanent total
disability should be made.
§35-1-82.54 U.C.A. states that upon referral of a
case to it by the Administrative Law Judge, the Commission
after a review of the entire record shall enter its award.
Nowhere in the Act is there an indication of what is to
be done in the event the quorum vote results in a tie.
It is submitted to this Court that just as many of the
commissioners voted for plaintiff as against.

The general

rule of statutory construction in workman's compensation cases
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breaks that deadlock.
A further equally recognized rule of construction resolves any doubt respecting the right
of compensation in favor of the injured
employee . . • and compensation statues should
be liberally construed in favor of recovery.
McPhie v. Industrial Cornm'n, supra.
The plaintiff is entitled to his award.
POINT IV
THOUGH PLAINTIFF ISN'T PARTICULAR ABOUT
THE SOURCE OF COMPENSATION, IT APPEARS
THAT THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY IS LIMITED
BY §35-1-69 U.C.A.
Though plaintiff isn't particular about the source of
the benefits he receives as a permanently and totally disabled
workman, in order to avoid delay in receiving compensation and
to avoid a potential future appeal, this Court should make
a ruling as to the responsible party or parties.
Plaintiff is of the opinion that the 1977 decision in
McPhie v. Industrial Cornm'n, supra is determinative.

Therein,

the Court interpreted §§35-1-67 and 35-1-69 U.C.A. in combination as meaning that the employer would be responsible for
the injury incurred during the employee's employment with that
particular employer.

See also, Intermountain Health Care

v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); White et al. v. Industrial
Cornm'n, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979); and Intermountain Smelting
v. Anthony Capitano, Sup. Ct. No. 16530 (March 24, 1980).
Here, the employer would be responsible for_the-15% permanent partial loss of bodily function attributable to the
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industrial accident, and his proportionate share of the medicali
and temporary total benefits.

The Second Injury Fund should

be responsible for the remainder for plaintiff's lifetime.
CONCLUSION
The uncontroverted facts of this case show that plaintiff
has a 30% loss of bodily function with 15% of that predating
his industrial injury.

All of the witnesses testified that

plaintiff is totally disabled from his former employment.
A clinical psychologist, at least two vocational rehabilitation
specialists, the Social Security Administration, and independent
as well as treating physicians were of the opinion that no
jobs whatsoever would be available to the plaintiff.

Because

of that situation and the very severe physical limitations
resulting from the combination of injuries, the vocational
rehabilitation expert of the Industrial Commission to whom
the Commission referred plaintiff, certified under oath that
plaintiff was not a candidate for rehabilitation. No evidence
whatsoever was introduced by any party to controvert the
above facts.
The plaintiff, therefore, falls into the "odd-lot" doctrine placing the

burde~

on defendants to present affirmative

evidence that there is a regular job opportunity in the labor
market available to the plaintiff.

Absent that, §35-1-67

mandates that " • . . the Commission shall order that there be
paid to such employee weekly benefits .

• • for such period
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of time beginning with the time that the payments . . . to
be made by the employer . . . terminate and ending with
the death of the employee."
The Commission erred in taking administrative notice of
the availability to plaintiff of benchwork and telephone and
mail solicitation jobs.

There was unbiased, competent and

uncontroverted evidence to the contrary by plaintiff's witnesses and the Commission's own expert.

This Court should

review the propriety of the administrative notice as allowed
by Rule 12(2) U.R.E.

The Court cannot help but find that the

availability of such jobs to this plaintiff is not a "

pro-

position of generalized knowledge . . . so universally known
that [it] cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute."
9 U.R.E.

Rule

It was beyond fairness and justice for the Commission

to so shift the burden of proof in such an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
The Commission sustained the Administrative Law Judge's
decision with one Commissioner voting to sustain it, one
Commissioner voting to award the benefits, and the third
Conunissioner disqualifying himself.
on how to resolve such a deadlock.

The statutes are silent
In that event the

rules of statutory construction in a workman's·compensation
case require that any doubt be resolved in favor of awarding
compensation.
Finally, §§35-1-67 and 35-1-69 U.C.A. would appear
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to limit the employer's liability to the industrial injury
only.

When combined injuries result in permanent total dis-

ability, the Second Injury Fund should pay the remainder.
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Commission acted beyond its power and authority in a capricious
and arbitrary manner in denying plaintiff permanent total

compensation contrary to the unequivocal and unrebutted evidence,
This case should be reversed-and remanded with instructions
to the Commission to enter an order for the benefits requested
herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~

day of May, 1980.

BLACK & MOORE
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